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Why Coevolution of Culture and 
Institutions Matters for Economic 
Development and Growth?
Kyriaki I. Kafka, Pantelis C. Kostis and Panagiotis E. Petrakis
Abstract
Theoretical considerations that choose to make reference to the institutional and 
cultural considerations presuppose that these are in an optimal form. However, this 
is not the case in the real world. This chapter argues that the coevolution require-
ments of institutional and culture change are critical for economic outcomes. When 
institutions and culture coevolve in an optimal pattern, economic development and 
growth are facilitated. In contrast, when institutions and culture deviate from the 
optimal pace of coevolution, incompatible alterations of institutions and culture 
may end up causing an inability of the policy designers to implement the required 
changes in institutions and/or cultural behaviors. The result can be a series of failing 
attempts to implement a modernized progrowth framework of institutional settings 
and cultural behaviors. Using a dataset of 80 countries for the period 1981–2019, 
the analysis concludes that institutions and culture are complements—and not 
substitutes—in terms of their role in economic development, as when both sizes are 
strong it leads to higher levels of GDP per capita. When either or both of them are at 
a weak level, economic development is much lower.
Keywords: culture, institutions, economic development, economic growth, 
coevolution
1. Introduction
Many studies and empirical works have come to conclusions about the impor-
tant role of the institutional and/or cultural background in economic development 
and growth. Theoretical constructs that choose to refer to the institutional and 
cultural background presuppose that both of these backgrounds are in optimal 
form. However, this is not the case in the real world.
The requirements regarding the coevolution of the institutional and cultural 
background are crucial to the development process of an economy. When institu-
tions and culture coevolve in an optimal pattern, economic growth is facilitated. In 
contrast, when institutions and culture deviate from the optimal pace of coevolu-
tion, incompatible alterations of institutions and culture may end up causing an 
inability of the policy designers to implement the required changes in institutions 
and/or cultural behaviors. The result can be a series of failed attempts to implement 
a modernized development framework for the institutional and cultural back-
ground of societies, leading to the perpetuation of stagnated growth prototypes. 
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A stagnated growth prototype can be transformed into a progrowth one by intro-
ducing ambitious institutional and cultural alterations through structural reforms. 
These reforms require the optimal coevolution of institutions and culture. However, 
the process of the reorganization of the institutional background and the change 
of culture can be seriously interrupted by the so-called coevolution requirements 
of institutions and cultural background. In fact, the evolution of institutions and 
culture can be toward the same direction but may not coincide time-wise. Then, 
the prevailing cultural background, which has not been altered yet, could work as a 
brake to the new institutional setting or vice versa. Therefore, the implementation 
of structural reforms can fail, given that institutional and cultural behaviors can be 
incompatible.
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the problems arising from the asyn-
chronous change of the institutional and cultural background for the economic 
development and growth. In that way, the aim is to highlight the interconnection 
between the institutional and cultural background and how this interconnection 
affects the economies. In other words, the chapter aims to show whether the insti-
tutional and cultural background functions in a complementary or substitutive way 
in their role in economic development, contributing to the debate on whether or not 
they coevolve. The analysis is based on a sample of 80 countries for the period from 
1981 to 2019.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: In Section 2, the coevolution of 
institutions and cultural requirements is presented. In Section 3, why institutions 
and culture usually lead to stagnated growth prototypes is presented. In Section 4, 
a descriptive analysis on culture is presented and institutions are complements or 
substitutes, while Section 5 analyses the fact that structural reforms that promote 
growth need institutional and cultural changes that also promote growth. Finally, 
the chapter ends with the conclusions.
2. The coevolution of institutions and culture
In general, the problem of coevolution in a system, the subparts of which evolve 
at a different pace, creates imbalances and failures in its effective operation. The 
evolution of institutions and culture does not always present a compatible path of 
evolution leading to conflicts when institutions and culture do not match. The issue 
under investigation has a time dimension, but usually it has a qualitative nature as 
well. In other words, institutions may change at the same direction with the cultural 
background, but these changes may not be compatible as far as the end result is 
concerned.
Thus, incompatibility may arise because either the institutions may change 
but not the cultural background or the cultural behaviors may change but the 
institution changes do not follow. In addition, incompatibility may appear because 
both concepts may evolute but their stationary equilibrium is not characterized 
by the optimum supplementary combination of institutions and cultural behavior 
matching.
But there is an even worse situation of incompatibility. This is when a change 
in institutions may appear and the noncompatible cultural behaviors would act to 
oppose and cancel these changes and vice versa. This is a very probable situation, 
which can arise after the implementation of an institutional structural reform, 
which we usually expect to be enforced and have fruitful results on growth in short- 
or medium-term horizon, but the prevailing cultural behaviors may sterilize those 
reforms.
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On the one hand, the cultural background is usually a slow-moving structure, 
which evolves in the long and the very long run (sometimes it can take more than 
100 years to change). Globalization effects and other megatrends (e.g., the aging) 
may lead to incremental changes of the cultural background. Norris and Inglehart 
[1] conclude to the cultural backlash hypothesis in the sense that factors such as 
generational substitution, increased access to higher education, urbanization, 
increased gender equality, and increased ethnic diversity have led to cultural back-
ground changes in the last decades in the high developed world. Moreover, there 
may exist several external shocks (like an economic crisis) or migration shocks that 
can change the cultural background even in the short run [2, 3].
On the other hand, institutions can change at different speeds too. Institutions 
can be divided into two categories, based on the speed of their evolution: fast-mov-
ing institutions (such as political institutions), which can change overnight, either 
through a legislative intervention or after revolutionary moments; and slow-moving 
institutions (such as the property rights, cooperation procedures, etc.), which 
need a long period of time through a gradual and constant process of evolution 
[4]. A basic question raised is why countries with ineffective institutions do not 
“copy” the institutions of developed countries [5]. The answer lies in the fact that 
institutions do not change easily; it takes 10–100 years for formal institutions and 
100–1000 years for informal in order to be changed [6]. Thus, the political leader-
ship usually finds it very difficult to innate a similar process of structural reform.
In this way, during the process of their evolution, a vicious cycle of interaction 
between the institutions and culture can be created. If the two concepts could 
change at the same rate, that is, when there is coevolution, then the economy could 
approach a new point of equilibrium, enhancing the efficiency of the economic 
system.
The relevant literature on the coevolution of institutions and culture focuses 
on the hypothesis of the natural selection of the institutions [7–11]. According to 
that, some institutional and behavioral traits might give competitive advantage to 
individuals or populations within their local environment [12]. Nevertheless, gain-
ing an understanding of the way in which institutions and culture interact is not an 
easy task, due to the endogenous character of their evolution [13, 14].
Samuel Bowles’ contribution to the field of coevolution process [8–10, 15–17] 
focuses on the impact of the institutions on human behavior through the ways in 
which particular institutional settings prompt individuals to draw one or another 
response from their varied behavioral repertoires. Furthermore, the structure of 
social interactions, both within and between groups, affects the pace and direc-
tion of cultural evolution, the economic institutions and policies that influence 
ingroup-outgroup relationships, and other aspects of preferences, casting doubt on 
the economists’ canonical premise that preferences are exogenous [18]. In addition, 
some institutions may reduce the variance of reproductive success within groups 
and, thus, weaken the force of selection on the level of individuals [8]. The emer-
gence of these institutions depends on the existence of such group-beneficial traits 
and these in turn may only be able to proliferate if these institutions are in place.
According to Veblen [19], institutions shall be understood as the rules, habits, 
and other culturally transmitted norms that individuals follow when interacting 
with each other [20]. He shows that evolution may also create institutions that are 
complementary to the mate choice based on genetically fixed preferences, which 
can be interpreted as genetically coded information processing. The evolutionary 
theory of institutional change of [19] centers on the notion of “habits of thought,”, 
where habits are viewed as durable and adaptable—in the long run—propensi-
ties on how to think and act. Because these habits reside within individuals, 
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institutional change involves the simultaneous coevolution of both shared prevalent 
habits of thought (institutions) and the habits of individuals [21]. Endogenous 
interactions among institutions and culture, and their coevolution are important 
during economic evolution [13].
However, we do not have adequate critical information on how economic institu-
tions may impact on culture, due to the fact that we know very little about the 
process of cultural transmission, which means that we do not have adequate infor-
mation on who acquires what trait from whom, under what conditions, why, how, 
and how persistent the traits may be once the initiating environment is withdrawn 
[22]. Furthermore, there is no strong evidence on how culture and institutions 
evolve over time and whether they mutually reinforce each other or whether one is 
a precursor to the other [23]. Thus, the question is posed on whether culture and 
institutions coevolve or they proceed independently or causality is unidirectional.
Bisin and Verdier [24] claim that culture and institutions jointly evolve and 
interact, and focus on the process as determined by the interaction and not on the 
cause of the interaction. They define the cultural (or institutional) multiplier as the 
ratio of the total effect of institutional (or cultural) change on economic prosper-
ity divided by the direct effect, that is, the counterfactual effect that would have 
occurred had the distribution of cultural traits in the population (or the institu-
tions) remained constant after the institutional (or cultural) change. In that way, 
they contribute to the analysis of whether culture and institutions coevolve or their 
change is incompatible in time and quality considerations.
In sum, the coevolution process of institutions and culture is the product of 
complex interactions between human behavior, preferences, economic perfor-
mance, and time. How and in which speed the institutions change vis-à-vis the 
cultural background-and vice versa-is particularly important, as coevolution affects 
the effectiveness of the growth model, since different degrees of compatibility can 
be observed.
3. The role of institutions and culture in stagnated growth prototypes
The existence of an optimum structure of institutions that is associated with 
an optimal nexus of cultural values can exist at the theoretical level for the sake 
of simplifying reality and for improving the analytical tools of comprehension. 
Thus, in real economy, “stagnated growth prototypes” are created since usually the 
institutions and culture that prevail interrupt the process of economic development 
and growth and could be characterized as idiosyncratic [25]. The prevalence of a 
stagnated growth prototype has crystal-clear effects on the mode of operation of 
the economies, the most important one being the increase in the level of insecurity 
and the inefficient allocation of resources. Thus, an optimal growth pattern often 
cannot be encountered, as the existence of idiosyncratic institutions is one of the 
most significant reasons for the deviation from the optimal pattern [25].
For instance, a stagnated growth prototype could be described as following1 
[25]: (a) Existence of extractive institutions [26]. The economies that are domi-
nated by extractive institutions are characterized by the absence of established 
relations between the members of the economic system. This results in the 
emergence of conditions that favor factors that enhance the existence of idiosyn-
cratic institutions. Factors that enhance the creation of idiosyncratic institutions 
(hierarchies and high transaction costs) are coordination failures, asymmetries of 
1 It is not the only possible form of deviation from optimality but we chose to concentrate on that due to 
the fact that it could describe better an emerging economy that faces a long period of stagnation.
5Why Coevolution of Culture and Institutions Matters for Economic Development and Growth?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90631
information, evolution path dependence, and rent-seeking activities, which all lead 
to the appearance of high systematic risk. (b) Existence of specific characteristics 
that act in a peculiar manner, shaping human behavior and preferences. This could 
be the case when there exist idiosyncratic cultural values like uncertainty avoidance 
behaviors, in-group collectivism, high time discount preferences, and lack of trust, 
as well as nondiversified investment attitudes [27, 28] and loss aversion behaviors 
[29–31].
There is a two-sided effect between idiosyncratic institutions and idiosyncratic 
cultural background described above, since the existence of idiosyncratic institu-
tions can lead to the formation of an idiosyncratic cultural background and vice 
versa. This interrelationship perpetuates the existence of idiosyncratic institutions 
and cultural characteristics. Thus, a stagnated growth prototype is generated and 
prevails. This stagnated growth prototype has no endogenous energy to break the 
barriers to growth. Stagnated institutions always affect culture and vice versa, 
through the coevolution pattern that they follow and that has a long lasting ability 
to survive. When a stagnated growth prototype is prevailing in an economy, it can 
experience long periods of stagnation or periods near stagnation. These periods 
usually can be interrupted only by large waves of foreign incoming capital, which 
usually take the form of a very large public or private investments in specific 
sectors.
4. Culture and institutions: complements or substitutes?
In this section, we try to examine whether the cultural and the institutional 
background of the societies and the economies are characterized as substitutes 
or complemented issues in relation to their effects on economic development. To 
achieve the objectives of the chapter, a dataset of 80 countries2 is used for the period 
of 1981–2019.
Initially, as a measure of economic development, GDP per capita (purchasing 
power parity; 2011 international dollars) is used derived from the World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
To measure the cultural background, the present chapter makes a selective selec-
tion of seven cultural values that express the cultural background of the societies 
that make up the sample under analysis, based on relevant studies in the literature 
[2, 32–34]. The data contributing to the cultural background were compiled from 
the World Values Survey (WVS) and supplemented by data from the European 
Values Study (EVS) for corresponding questions, on the following waves: 1981–
1984, 1990–1994, 1995–1998, 1999–2004, 2005–2009, 2010–2014, and 2017–2019.
Specifically, for the measurement of the cultural background, an overall 
measure was used that emerges as the first principal component of a principal 
component analysis (PCA) for the following seven cultural values: generalized 
trust, control of life, respect, independence, honesty, competition affinity, and 
2 The countries used in the analysis are the following: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Haiti, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran 
(Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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work ethic. The cultural values of honesty, competition affinity, and work ethic 
result again as the primary components from specific PCAs—using queries selected 
by WVS and EVS to express each value. The way generalized trust, control of life, 
independence, honesty, competition affinity, and work ethic are calculated is 
described in [2], while for the variable respect in [33]. The first principal compo-
nent that emerges for the overall measurement of the cultural background follows 
a normalization on a scale of 0–10 (according to [35]), with 0 signaling a weak 
cultural background and 10 signaling a strong cultural background.
To measure institutional background, the World Economic Freedom Index 
is used as reported by the Fraser Institute [36]. The construction of the index is 
based on 42 subindices and is set on a scale of 0–10, with 10 representing the best 
performance and 0 the worst performance. Despite the availability of alterna-
tive indicators to reflect the institutional background of economies (such as the 
Heritage Foundation’s financial freedom index and the protection against the risk of 
expropriation of the ICRG), the Fraser Institute Index is used as the most appropri-
ate because of the long period under study as well as due to the sample size of the 
countries covered by this indicator. The degree of economic freedom, based on this 
indicator, is calculated on the basis of the institutions and policies applied by each 
country in five areas: size of state, rule of law, access to a strong currency, freedom 
of international trade, and regulatory environment in bank credit, employment, 
and entrepreneurship.
Authoritative research has consistently confirmed that people living in coun-
tries with a high degree of economic freedom enjoy a higher level of prosperity, 
have wider political and social rights, and present longer life expectancy. Hall and 
Lawson [37] conduct a literature review using the Fraser Financial Freedom Index. 
They result in 402 articles using this index, 198 of them using it as an independent 
variable. They note that 134 of these 198 articles conclude that financial freedom 
leads to faster economic development and growth, better living standards, higher 
levels of happiness, etc., while only 8 articles conclude that financial freedom has 
a negative impact to economic growth through increasing economic inequalities. 
Williamson et al. [35, 38–40]—among others—use the Fraser Financial Freedom 
Index as a measure of the quality of the institutional background. They note that 
this is a comprehensive measure that includes the factors that historically econo-
mists have found to be significantly related to economic development and growth.
The foundation of the relationship between the cultural and institutional 
background and their relation to GDP per capita of the economies is outlined in a 
four-quadrant scatter plot, as shown in Figure 1.
The first quadrant (A) brings together countries with strong institutional and 
weak cultural backgrounds, the second quadrant (B) countries with strong insti-
tutional and cultural backgrounds, the third quadrant (C) countries with weak 
institutional and cultural backgrounds, and the fourth quadrant (D) countries with 
weak institutional and strong cultural backgrounds.
For each country included in the sample, its average values for the cultural 
background, institutional background, and GDP per capita are calculated for the 
entire analysis period, so that for each country, there is one value for each variable. 
Following the methodology of [41], countries with a strong cultural background/
institutional background are those with scores above 7, while those with a weak 
cultural background/institutional background are those with score below 6.
Figure 2 illustrates in a descriptive way the relationship between cultural and 
institutional background and their relation to the level of economic development. 
Countries in quadrants (A) and (B) clearly outperform those countries in quadrants 
(C) and (D), as they have a stronger institutional background. Moreover, countries 
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belonging to quadrants (B) and (D) clearly outperform those in quadrants (A) and 
(C), as they present a stronger cultural background.
Quadrant (B) countries, those with strong institutional (average 7.83) and 
strong cultural background (average 8.07), have the highest average GDP per 
capita of $ 39.826. This group includes countries such as Norway, Sweden, Hong 
Kong, Switzerland, and Canada, countries that are characterized by high economic 
freedom and at the same time by social behaviors that promote economic develop-
ment and growth, such as high levels of generalized trust, respect, independence, 
and honesty. In contrast, countries in quadrant (C), those with weak institutional 
(average 5.39) and weak cultural background (average 3.41), have the lowest aver-
age GDP per capita of $ 8.443. This group includes countries such as Iran, Libya, 
Zimbabwe, Algeria, and Venezuela, that is, countries with a low degree of economic 
Figure 1. 
Strength of institutions and culture.
Figure 2. 
Descriptive foundation of the cultural/institutional background relationship and the GDP per capita.
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Country GDP per capita Cultural background Institutional background
Quadrant A: Strong Institutions, Weak Culture France 34558.47 5.61 7.08
Spain 28817.90 5.21 7.14
New Zealand 28268.62 5.76 8.05
Czech Republic 26175.23 4.15 7.21
Slovakia 20558.37 4.00 7.07
Lithuania 19989.40 5.16 7.16
Estonia 19887.70 5.57 7.52
Malaysia 17286.46 5.57 7.01
Latvia 16185.53 4.99 7.25
Kazakhstan 15735.42 4.78 7.00
Chile 15360.80 5.28 7.31
Lebanon 12649.27 3.36 7.05
Georgia 5716.39 4.06 7.59
Armenia 5075.77 3.23 7.57
Vietnam 3330.30 5.89 6.05
Average of Quadrant A 17973.04 4.84 7.21
Quadrant B: Strong Institutions, Strong Culture Norway 55653.87 9.35 7.38
Switzerland 49494.08 7.54 8.35
The Netherlands 40332.87 8.71 7.61
Hong Kong 37889.14 7.87 8.86
Germany 37573.25 7.60 7.69
Sweden 37068.91 8.74 7.34
Canada 36705.35 7.18 8.00
Australia 36647.47 7.24 7.81
Finland 33646.95 8.71 7.60
Japan 33247.75 7.72 7.65
Average of Quadrant B 39825.96 8.07 7.83
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Country GDP per capita Cultural background Institutional background
Quadrant C: Weak Institutions, Weak Culture Libya 26331.32 3.33 4.69
Russian Federation 19549.52 4.58 5.94
Poland 16716.41 5.44 5.81
Argentina 15807.43 4.60 5.38
Venezuela 15032.13 1.60 4.45
Iran 14920.61 3.46 4.87
Brazil 12418.27 2.73 5.27
Algeria 11667.48 3.09 4.48
Dominican Republic 9441.76 4.19 5.98
Egypt 8778.71 4.69 5.40
Ecuador 8530.45 3.72 5.69
Ukraine 7201.05 4.74 5.32
Nigeria 4075.95 2.07 5.13
Pakistan 3639.66 3.97 5.59
Ghana 3585.80 2.17 5.75
India 3413.81 3.33 5.99
Zambia 2782.47 3.29 5.41
Zimbabwe 2540.86 3.12 4.60
Bangladesh 2180.83 4.43 5.34
Haiti 1777.94 0.00 5.96
Mali 1641.60 2.57 5.43
Burkina Faso 1195.23 2.91 5.99
Ethiopia 977.15 4.37 5.52
Average of Quadrant C 8443.76 3.41 5.39
Quadrant D: Weak Institutions, Strong Culture — — — —
Note: Countries not falling into a quadrant are (not characterized by either strong or by weak institutional and cultural background): Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, Uruguay, and Yemen.
Table 1. 
Countries belonging in each quadrant and averages.
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freedom and social attitudes that oppose economic development and growth 
processes. A comparison of these two quadrants highlights that the institutional 
and cultural backgrounds are complementary, as when both are strong, a signifi-
cantly higher degree of economic development is achieved. Countries in quadrant 
(A), those with strong institutional (average 7.21) but weak cultural backgrounds 
(average 4.84), average GDP per capita of $ 17.973. This group includes countries 
such as Latvia, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Lebanon, and Kazakhstan, which, 
while characterized by a high degree of economic freedom, are also character-
ized by social behaviors that are opposed to economic development and growth 
processes. A comparison with quadrant (C) shows that the improvement of the 
institutional background leads to a much higher level of economic growth. Also, the 
scatter chart does not show countries belonging to quadrant (D) characterized by 
weak institutional and strong cultural background, while the opposite relationship 
holds (quadrant A). This demonstrates that the cultural background alone is not 
sufficient and exists only in a strong form when there is also a strong institutional 
background, thus reinforcing the hypothesis of complementarity between the two 
kinds of background.
Table 1 gives a detailed breakdown of the countries belonging to each quadrant 
and the average of each country for GDP per capita, cultural background, and 
institutional background.
5.  Structural reforms that promote growth need institutional and 
cultural changes that also promote growth
Structural reforms imply changes both at an institutional and cultural level 
in order to ensure economic development and growth in the long term by rais-
ing the growth potential. This is so because they are able to increase the GDP, 
reduce unemployment, and ‘fortify’ the economy against potential shocks. In this 
direction, what is regarded as structural reform may include the intervention in 
transaction costs, product and service markets, and the labor market, reducing 
entry barriers, improving public sector administration, and enhancing the role of 
private sector over government [42]. Structural reforms usually include policies that 
make labor markets more adaptable and responsive, liberalizing the service sectors, 
increasing competition in product and service markets, improving the institutions 
for the strengthening of market efficiency, improving the entrepreneurial climate, 
and encouraging innovation [43]. Additionally, structural reforms are the key to 
sustainable development [44] as the enhancement of productivity constitutes a 
factor that promotes the improvement of the standard of living in emerging and 
developing economies, leading to a removal of the obstacles to the efficient utiliza-
tion of resources. Thus, the need for transformation from a stagnated to an optimal 
growth model requires structural reforms referring to institutions and culture.
Institutions are one of the most important areas affected by the implementation 
of structural reforms [45]. This is why structural reforms usually concern institu-
tional reforms that involve market, or even nonmarket, institutions. Essentially, 
market institutions refer to economic institutions and thus reforms concern institu-
tions such as the labor market, the product market, the taxation, social security 
and financial system, etc. Reforms in nonmarket institutions may concern political 
institutions (quality of democracy, politicians/political parties, municipalities, 
etc.) or social institutions (judicial system, legal system, army, education system, 
healthcare system, etc.).
Johnson [45] examines the relationship between the time of the implementation 
of major reforms and the institutional quality index, concluding that countries 
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with more powerful institutions (as they are approached from the perspective of 
property rights and the rule of law) introduced important reforms earlier. In other 
words, it seems that there is a negative association between the time of the imple-
mentation of structural reforms and the quality of the institutions.
Moreover, Kafka [3] concludes that the only way for economies to improve their 
institutional background and their innovative performance and to converge with 
the economies that form the frontier of performance in innovation and institutions 
is through economic policies to accelerate change in the institutional background, 
such as structural reforms. Her analysis concludes to the creation of thermal maps 
that present—for each of the 152 economies included in the analysis—the specific 
institutions that need to be structurally reformed.
Furthermore, surveys such as those by [46–48] associate political institutions 
with economic reform effectiveness. Rajan and Zingales [47] note that democracy 
can obstruct reforms, if special interests prevail in the societies where these reforms 
are implemented, given that the capitalists are usually fortified in speculative posi-
tions and, thus, they often are the primary opponents of economic reforms, which 
may disrupt their interests. Fernandes and Rodrik [46] reach a similar conclusion, 
stressing that interest groups may block reforms if there is certainty over the 
distribution of the benefits of structural reforms. Also, Giuliano et al. [48] note that 
the increase in the quality of democratic institutions has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on structural reforms. Haggard [49] claims that the institutions 
may overcome collective action dilemmas by restricting the selfish behavior of 
interest groups.
The literature seems to be especially interested in the question of whether the 
extensive and swift institutional changes lead to a reduction of the output that 
is produced, even when these changes involve institutions of higher quality and 
greater effectiveness. For example, Roland and Verdier [50] note that firms do not 
invest after structural reforms because they wait until the economy is stabilized, 
and this fact results in a reduction of product produced. Moreover, Blanchard and 
Kremer [51] explain that the reduction of output produced is the result of the inef-
fectiveness of negotiations between the firms. While a great deal of institutions can 
develop in a very short period of time [52], there are other institutions that require a 
significant amount of time in order to function effectively.
As far as the cultural background is concerned, often this must also change 
for the impact of structural reforms to be more effective. As Kafka [3] points 
out, changing the cultural background through economic policy requires a 
long-term wait for results that can exceed 20 or 30 years, while requiring inter-
ventions focused on the education of societies. But what economic policy makers 
should not miss is to take into account the cultural characteristics of their 
society before making decisions. Not all societies are ready to accept all eco-
nomic policies and each economic policy is expected to have different efficien-
cies based on the cultural characteristics of the society for which it is intended 
for [3]. Structural reforms must take into account not only the formal rules and 
procedures but also informal behaviors and deep-rooted models and values that 
lie between the formal declaration of the intention to implement a particular 
structural reform and its actual implementation [53]. Ban [54] argues that 
cultural background is a critical issue in every attempt to implement a structural 
reform.
An additional problem that arises regarding the cultural background concerns 
the fact that not all societies are ready to accept the structural reforms that are 
designed by the political actors. Consequently, reforms must have the appropriate 
flexibility in order to adapt to the needs of the society; only in this case will the 
society accept reforms and allow their implementation. Besides, the basic problem 
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is that the changes of the cultural background can only be slow-moving [55–57], 
even though there are behaviors that change even in a short-term horizon.
6. Conclusions
The forces deployed in the society either encourage the prevalence of features 
that promote a progrowth model or lead to a variety of problematic growth mod-
els, or to a mixture of progrowth and antigrowth characteristics with ambiguous 
results.
The transformation of a stagnated model to a progrowth one is not an easy task, 
focusing mainly on the coevolution requirements. Since the coevolution require-
ments cannot be met, there is a possibility that a perpetual stagnated prototype may 
become stronger. More specifically, the stagnated growth prototype may be trans-
formed into a progrowth optimal prototype through suitable structural reforms on 
institutional and cultural background. However, the coevolution process taking 
place between institutions and culture may interrupt this process, having as a result 
a series of failing attempts to implement a modernized progrowth framework of 
institution settings and cultural behaviors leading to the salvation of the existing 
stagnated growth prototype, despite the probable design of ambitious structural 
reforms.
The analysis of the chapter reveals the complementary relationship between the 
institutional and cultural background in terms of their role in economic develop-
ment and growth, as when both sizes are strong it leads to higher levels of GDP per 
capita. When either or both of them are at a weak level, economic development is 
much lower.
Thus, the existence of economic freedom is an important condition for econo-
mies to thrive. However, when these conditions are accompanied by social behaviors 
that promote economic development and growth and relate to individuals’ trust and 
independence, the highest possible level of economic growth is achieved.
For instance, the presence of institutional structures that adequately manage 
property rights and contracts between economic actors has a positive impact on the 
level of economic development. But when this is accompanied by a high level of 
generalized trust and respect for other members of the society, the positive impact 
on economic development multiplies as the performance of the already satisfying 
cultural background improves. In addition, when there is an institutional back-
ground in which government spending, taxation, and the size of state-controlled 
enterprises are such that state decisions do not replace private choices, financial 
freedom is increased with significant benefits for economic performance. But when 
this institutional framework characterizes societies that are independent of choices, 
the benefits of the institutional and cultural background to the level of economic 
development are even more crucial.
By presenting in a different way the conclusion about the complementarity of 
the two sizes, the results of the analysis lead to the fact that even if the institutional 
background is strong, it depends on whether the cultural background is weak 
(quadrant A in the analysis) or strong (quadrant B in the analysis) to determine 
whether or not an economy achieves satisfactory economic development. Thus, the 
same institutional background may have a different impact on economic develop-
ment depending on the cultural background.
This relationship gives a good explanation of why economic policies, such as 
structural reforms, are effective in some countries and noneffective in others. The 
transformation of a stagnated growth prototype to a progrowth one is not an easy 
task, focusing on the coevolution requirements. Since the coevolution requirements 
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cannot be met, there is a possibility that a perpetual stagnated prototype may 
become stronger. More specifically, the stagnated growth prototype may be trans-
formed into a progrowth optimal prototype through suitable structural reforms on 
institutional and cultural background. However, the coevolution process taking 
place between institutions and culture may interrupt this process, having as a result 
a series of failing attempts to implement a modernized progrowth framework of 
institution settings and cultural behaviors leading to the salvation of the existing 
stagnated growth prototype, despite the probable design of ambitious structural 
reforms. Thus, the conclusion on the complementarity of the two sizes is therefore 
an important contribution for all those who design or pursue economic policy in 
either developing or developed economies.
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